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The rise in cyber attacks against organisations and government agencies has created a 
need for improving security and monitoring of Information Technology assets. Analysis 
and monitoring of security events are one of the key areas when it comes to detecting and 
preventing security compromises in any organisation. While intrusion detection and 
prevention are often used to measure security management in an organisation, there are 
challenges of false positives, false negatives and information overload to the analysts 
tasked with monitoring.  
This work proposes to deliver an event collection and analysis system to monitor the 
security of Information Technology assets that have Windows Operating Systems, a 
centralised log management tool and dashboards to monitor analysed events in real-time 
for security alarms. The system will involve an agent to collect security and events from 
Windows Operating systems and send the events in a readable JSON format to the 
processing server for analysis and there after visualisation of various security events of 
interest. While security alarms such as bruteforce attacks can be identified and escalated 
to the security analysts. Testing was carried out by generating the desired security events 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
The security of servers and users’ endpoint computers is important for many 
organisations, and being able to detect and/or prevent security incidents in computing 
systems should be key. This could be in line with an organisation’s security and incident 
monitoring policy or just a best practice activity for the organisation. The threats against 
computing systems could range from malware activity, remote malicious user trying to 
gain access into the systems, unauthorised user access to files by real users who should 
not get the access and administrative activity being run by unknown users or non-
privileged users among many other security risks (Tubin, 2013). 
According to Manes Report (2016), Windows Operating systems are the most popular 
computing systems globally and hence many attacks are targeted and planned against 
these operating systems. These operating systems are not only used for personal 
computing but also for high level services in the IT infrastructure of organisations. 
Windows Operating System servers offer critical services such as Active Directory, 
Domain Control, Exchange Mail Server, File Server, Hypervisor, SQL Server, Web Server, 
DNS Server, and SharePoint Server among several more services that Windows server 
offers.  
Windows Servers can also be used to host proprietary or custom applications that 
organisations need for their core business e.g. some banks have their core banking 
applications running on the Windows servers, while hospitals have their Hospital 
Management Systems running in Windows Servers. It is the extensive use of Windows 
Operating systems in this dangerous era of information security that calls for a research 
on how these events can be collected for the purpose of monitoring. 
The collection of security and audit events is useful when it comes to forensic 




out during attacks. An attacker can delete the event trail from the compromised computer 
leaving no evidence of the malicious activities carried out. Having an remote machine to 
collect security events will be able to allow for better forensics investigation. This is 
because in most organisations there is generally a lack of proactive, comprehensive 
security systems dedicated to monitoring system irregularities (Glover, 2015).  
There are few users with expertise on information security threat detection and while IT 
administrators are good at their jobs of system maintenance and management, very few 
are aware of the security problems that organisations could have. Organisations may not 
have the financial power to employ a security administrator who has studied with the 
skills and experiences on the Information security and hence it will have the risks that 
come with information systems (Magalhaes, 2003). Since management of security is not 
a revenue generating factor in IT and is often overlooked during budgeting making it a 





1.2 Problem Statement 
Information Technology systems in any organisation will generate thousands of logs 
per minute, with security events being among them. A challenge is being able to 
identify and filter important security events that could be useful in detecting a 
security compromise or fraud. If one can collect the security events that are generated, 
and get real-time awareness of all the events that occur, then they will have a view of 
the organisation’s security standpoint. With these data being analysed it is easier for 
an organisation to determine how compliant they are to regulatory policies related to 
information security (EY, 2014). 
Current systems used for the extraction and analysis of security events face major 
challenges due to the enormous sizes of Windows event files and complexities in 
understanding the attack patterns connected to a security Incident. This leads to slow 
event analysis which is time consuming. Currently, forensic investigators and security 
professional lack efficient standard platforms to define and share attack patterns in 
regards to event analysis. Most of the existing solutions are expensive and cannot be 
affordable to most organiations while the opensource tools require a lot technical 
expertise to work effectively (RiskFocus, 2014). 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
i. To review the role of security monitoring and event collection. 
ii. To review the existing solutions used in security and audit and event collection. 
iii. To design and develop and test a platform that can collect, analyse and visualise 
Windows security events. 





1.4 Research Questions 
i. What is the purpose of security and audit and event collection? 
ii. What are the existing solutions for security and audit and event collection and 
analysis? 
iii. How will the platform be designed ? 
iv. How will the platform be tested ? 
 
1.5 Justification 
The collection of security and audit events and logs to a remotes platform is one of the 
most common requirements for any information security compliance standard 
(Ipswitch,2010). This is because that an audit trail of all security events needs to exist 
outside the source of the events to ensure integrity and independence in case of a forensic 
investigation. According to the Guide to Computer Security Log Management by 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommends that all 
organisations are able to carry out audit log review for every system that is used to run 
the IT infrastructure as a measure of good practice (Karen Kent, 2006).  
Having audit log review means that periodically the organisation checks to see was user 
activity of security impact has been carried out by mainly administrative users. This acts 
as a deterrent to those with malicious intentions and also aids in the battle against fraud 
carried out through computing systems. Some organisations may never know if 
unauthorised changes have been made to their Active Directory policies or Active 
Control Lists (ACLs), even in organisations where important Intellectual Property is 
stored in servers.  
 
1.6 Scope and Limitations 
The system developed is limited to a platform that collects and analyses events from 




that can offer security and audit events from the inbuilt Windows system. The research 
does not cover any other operating system apart from Windows based.  The system is 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the literature review with the purpose of identifying the need for 
security monitoring and event collection. It will give an introduction to the chosen 
Operating systems as a case for the study which is Windows Operating System. There 
will be a review of the existing solutions used for collection, analysis and visualisation of 
Windows security and audit events.  
2.2 Security Threats in Operating Systems  
A computer is both a logical and physical system, the hardware part is what we all see 
but what we do not see is the logical part. The logical part involves software that uses the 
hardware resources to allow us to use the computer (Rouse, 2013). But before software is 
made useable to the people there needs to be an interface that connects the hardware to 
the software and that is the role of the Operating System. The Operating System (OS) is 
a program that manages other programs, in this case application programs, it is the role 
of the Operating Systems to ensure that physical resources provided by the hardware are 
useable to the applications and the user, such as: allowing for multitasking where 
multiple applications can run concurrently as the Operating System manages the use of 
CPU and RAM to avoid overloads. This means that it will allow the input and output 
hardware i.e. keyboard, mouse or monitor to be useful and also manage the resources 
such as RAM, ROM or Processor as they are used by the application programs (Rouse, 
2013).  
Threats to Operating Systems are those that create unauthorized actions by users of a 
computer (Microsoft, 2011). These extended to include the breach to privacy, 
confidentiality, and integrity. Threats are categorized as either malicious or non-
malicious. The non-malicious attacks are those that come from users and employees with 




computers are predisposed to. On the other hand malicious attacks usually come from 
external entities or disgruntled employees who are well aware of their actions as they 
compromise the security of the organization (Rouse, 2013). Information has become a 
valueable asset in most organizations and to gain a competitive edge most attackers have 
the aim of acquiring trade secret information from companies. Since Operating Systems 
are the base of every computing system they are easily targeted for security compromise. 
Attackers will try to force authentication and exploit vulnerabilities in oprating systems 
so as to collect information processed by applications or stored within the computer. One 
of the most common way to compromise Operating Systems is by compromising the 
password of a user. The problem usually is remembering the correct password from 
among the multitude of passwords a user needs to remember, this leads to password 
reuse becoming common. Attackers know that people are the weakest link to security 
and having phishing attacks to aqcuire passwords can become fruitful if a user has reused 
the password in a computing system (Rouse, 2013).  
2.3 Windows Operating System  
Windows is a line of operating systems developed by Microsoft and it is the most popular 
globally with over 80% market share  (Hruska, 2016). This because of its flagship OS with 
a graphical user interface (GUI) which was Windows 1.0 in 1985. Having the GUI allowed 
computers to be more useable to everyone, including those who were not skilled in MS 
DOS (Darcy, 2014). Over the years Microsoft has improved the Windows OS with newer 
versions that have still dominated the market (Hruska,2016). The most current one is 
Windows 10 for personal computers which was released in 2016 and for servers, there is 
Windows Server 2016 (Chapple, 2016). 
 
2.4 Security Management Systems 
2.4.1 Security Information Management (SIM)  




collecting events from multiple security log sources, monitoring, analysing security 
events and having a long term event storage plan for the events. 
A SIM system will automate this process, making it simpler for the security team to have 
a central collection point for security events from systems such as Intrusion Detection 
Systems, firewalls, proxy servers and anti-virus and other systems within the 
organisation. A typical SIM should be able to collect events from various log sources, 
normalise all collected events into a standard structure, then analyse the data to give a 
proper presentation of all security events from the infrastructure (Schmidt, 2013).  
A SIM will allow for log collection of security events by normalizing and indexing the 
data then compressing the events from raw unstructured data into structured 
information that can be used for trend analysis or compliance reporting. Event collection 
happens in several ways depending on the source of the event. This can be done from 
configuration on the application or operating system and when that is not possible an 
agent application can be installed to collect and send the events to the SIM server (Kumar, 
2012). 
 
2.4.2 Security Event Manager (SEM) 
Security Event Managers (SEMs) have a different purpose from SIMs as they are used to 
collect events, normalise it, then use correlation to generate alerts and alarms that will be 
resolved or analysed by the security analyst (Kumar, 2012). The SEM will summarise the 
events into only important information and will not store the raw logs unlike the SIM . 
After correlation of events and filtering of security rules the security alerts generated by 
the SEM be assigned to various administrators as tickets to be resolved. Most SEMs have 
reporting capability but they are not as customizable as those from a SIM due to the 
amount of data stored by the SEM from collected events. The stock reports could be a 
collection of compliance reports of things such as failed authentication, account lockouts 




2013) the following: event management, real time threat analysis, visualisation, ticketing, 
incident response. 
SEM products are ideal for running security operations such as a Managed Security 
Service Provision (MSSP), this is where an organization does the security management 
and monitoring for several organizations. The major weakness for SEM is that they are 
not good at log management, long term storage or log compression unlike SIM products 
(Kumar, 2012).  
 
2.4.3 Security Information  Event Management (SIEM) 
A “SIEM” is a group of complex technologies that together provide a bird’s-eye view into 
an infrastructure (Pigee, 2016). It will combine the capabilities of SIM and SEM, to give 
real-time analysis of security alerts generated by the systems in the infrastructure, while 
allowing for long term storage of logs captured. The SIEM should gather, analyse 
(including correlation) and present information from the systems in the infrastructure. 
This information could be from: access control information from OS, application and 
devices, vulnerability management tools, policy and compliance tools, database and 
application logs (Kumar, 2012). 
The SIEM has multiple features that enable it to be as versatile as it is. The main feature 
of a SIEM is Event Collection. A SIEM should first be able to collect events from all 
possible log sources including custom application (Pigee, 2016). Once events have been 
collected the next step is Log Normalization here the SIEM should organise the data into 
respective fields, think of this like in a database table where a row contains a single event 
while the columns represent different fields on each row such as username, Event ID, log 
source, IP-address, timestamp and so on (Pigee, 2016). Indexing happens once the data 
has been normalised, the indexing of important data from the database should happen 
which allows for faster searching and correlation with the important fields such as 




into the system allows for similar events to be consolidate so as to increase efficiency and 
save on storage (Kumar,2012). 
Analysis is done by the SIEM through inbuilt filters and event rules to identify events 
that are deemed to be of security concern to the organisation. This could be events such 
as remote logins to servers or network scanning packets being identified by the IDS. After 
the analysis of events correlation can be done on the events. Correlation is where two or 
more different events have a consequential outcome, for example when multiple failed 
logins occur and then one becomes successful under a span of a few seconds, this could 
be a sign of brute force attack against the system (Pigee, 2016). 
With a SIEM, alerting can be done once correlation and event analysis has been completed 
and parametres set by the security analyst. The SIEM should create or send alerts via 
email, SMS or any other configured mode of notification to the relevant parties 
(Kumar,2012). Dashboards allows for visualisation of events of different categories. The 
dashboards are mainly high level view of the events but can also be technical e.g. when 
showing port statistics (Kumar,2012). Compliance of an organization to certain security 
standards can be done with all the events that the SIEM is able to collect from the various 
log sources. The SIEM should be able to give a view of certain compliance checks and 
then give reports that will answer some compliance checks e.g. ISO 27001, PCI DSS, 
HIPAA or any other regulatory standard (Kumar,2012). Retention of logs  is a feature that 
the SIEM needs in order to ensure that investigations can be carried out properly if need 
occurs. The retention period in most cases should be at least a year worth of events 
collected (Kumar,2012). 
 
2.5 Host Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS) 
These are applications that are installed in servers and end user computers to carry out 
to do log analysis, event correlation, integrity checking, policy enforcement, rootkit 




Institute, 2000). In Windows they will read the binary files in the Windows event manager 
and forward security events to the SIEM. These events could be like user being created 
or deleted in the operating system, password reset or changes and other security and 
audit events that could be of interest to security analysts. On UNIX systems the HIDS will 
read the auth.log file to capture similar events that are of security impact to the operating 
system (Bray, Hay, & Cid, 2008). 
When it comes to integrity checking, the HIDS will run a MD5 checksum on all critical 
files in the operating system and then monitor the file regularly for any change in the 
MD5 checksum value. If a critical file e.g. a Windows registry file is modified they event 
is sent to the SIEM where an alert is generated to the security analyst (Bray, Hay, & Cid, 
2008). 
 
2.5.1 Challenges With Security Monitoring Systems 
According to IT auditing software company Netwrix Corporation, 69 per cent of 
companies are looking to reduce SIEM bills while 65 per cent of users calim that it is hard 
to find necessary data upon request in a SIEM solution (Netwrix, 2016). The survey done 
Netwrix Corporation targeted 234 large organizations that used SIEM solutions for 
security and IT infrastructure monitoring. The results showed that SIEM solutions 
become expensive when it comes to their maintenance and support. While the cost of 
owning a SIEM was also driven up by the need to hire and train SIEM analysts 
(Fadilpasic, 2016).  
The top problems with SIEMs according to Alienvault (2014) is that, they are too complex 
especially for organizations to deploy in order to adequately claim to have security 
monitoring. The deployment of SIEMs usually takes too long as the SIEM has to be 
configured over a lengthy period of time in order to reduce false positives and fine tune 
as per the organizations needs. The licensing model to acquire a SIEM are also expensive 




SIEM becomes functional as expected (Alienvault 2014). 
 
2.6 The Intrusion Detection Challenge 
Security has become a key concern for developers and creators of software and any IT 
system, this is has been brought about by the increase in security incidents on IT systems 
over the past few years. With weaknesses in confidentiality, integrity, availability and 
many others being exposed on IT systems the need for security being a key integral part 
for any software or electronic system has increased.  
It is the confidentiality weaknesses in systems that has allowed many users' data to be 
exposed and used for malicious activities such as black-mail or identity theft. This has 
happened when systems do not store Personally Identifiable Information (PII) properly 
leading to exposure of patients' medical records from hospital systems and credit card 
information from e-commerce systems. According to The Data Breach Report by ITRC 
(2015), over 169 million personal records were exposed and that number is only from 781 
breaches that were made public by the affected institutions from the financial, education, 
government and healthcare sectors. With an IBM report giving the average cost of each 




collected from the healthcare sector having a price for $355 each (Ponemon, 2016).  
In 2016 only 41% of breaches were detected by the victims with the median time between 
the intrusion taking place and the victim being able to detect the intrusion being 15 days, 
while those detected by an external party being 28 days (Trustwave, 2016) . This shows 
how much time is taken for an attack to be detected by the victims, one can only imagine 
what kind of control an attacker can have after 15 days of compromising an organisation’s 
IT infrastructure without being detected. The biggest growth in compromises in 2015 was 
in the Corporate and Internal Network of organisations as shown in figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.2 shows that most of the attacks in 2015 were mainly targeting organisations and 
users, with destructive intents and card-not-present (CNP) being the most popular types 
of data compromise. 






Figure 2.2 Types of Data Compromises (Trustwave, 2016) 
 
2.7 Compromise Duration 
According to the Trustwave Global Security Report (2016), when it comes to an IT 
security incident, there are three key milestones in an attack lifetime, these are:  
a) Intrusion: the date where an attacker was able to gain unauthorised access to the 
victim's systems. 
b) Detection: the date on which the victim was able to identify the breach had taken place. 
c) Containment: the date when the compromised was stopped and the attacker denied 





Figure 2.3 Detection Time Span (Trustwave, 2016) 
 
In 2015 it took a median of 80 days for the victim to identify that they had an intrusion 
had taken place in their environment. It took 2 days for after detection for the containment 
to occur and 63 days from intrusion to containment, where containment was possible. 
From these one can clearly see that 80 days of being compromised without the victim 
being knowledgeable of the situation and even having a more challenging time 
containing the intrusion. It is this point that has shown a gap in early detection of security 
incidents. 
 
2.8 Purpose of Event Logging 
Most Operating systems and enterprise applications are designed with a logging feature, 
primarily it was used for debug information to show system administrators events that 
had led to an error. Developers used logging to catch exceptional conditions and log them 
to support staff, read invalid values and check if the applications work in the correct order 
(Kumar & Nanda, 2001). The option for security event logging was always there, 




errors were of greater concern (Sugano, 2003). The major issue seems to have been 
availability of the systems which was an issue because of programming maturity was not 
as it is today. Today logging of security and audit events is more or less a requirement 
from a compliance and governance standpoint (Ipswitch, 2010).  
 
2.9 Event and Log Management Best Practices 
Having and a defined audit policy is the first step for the organisation, the policy defines 
what type of events should the applications and operating systems record. Generally 
most compliance standards have similar requirements for an audit policy. In Microsoft 
Windows environment the audit policy can be configured from the domain controller in 
a LAN by modifying the group policies to reflect the recording of the required events. 
From the group policy settings the administrator can set different event logging settings 
for individual servers depending on their use and also for workstations (Microsoft, 2011). 
E.g. in servers that have MSSQL database running one will collect audit events for 
database access which may not be possible for servers that run Mail Exchange services, 
while on user workstations one can create policies depending on users; the CEO audit 
policies could be more serious compared to those of an intern since the type of 
information in the CEO's machine is highly sensitive (Ipswitch, 2010). Events logging 
categories that must be enabled include the Success and Failure of logon events, object 
access process tracking, policy change, account management, directory services access 
and systems events. 
Another best practice for event and log management is having a centralised collection 
and processing system (Lewis, 2014). This means that all events from production servers 
and users' workstations are collected in real-time to a server within the organisation or to 
a remote area. The system collecting the events should also be able to process and parse 
the various events into useful information. In most cases the events are only hosted in the 




system once they have finished their activity (Lewis, 2014). Having agents installed in 
each system is necessary to collect events as they are generated and shipped to the central 
log server. Some compliance standards such as Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) require that the 
logs to be stored for a year or even up to 7 years (Netwrix, 2016). Most systems may not 
have the capacity to store their own events for more than a year without having to write 
over old events for disk space management. Also the servers maybe replaced by newer 
once after a few years of usage, which means that if a server in a forensics case was retired 
before the statutory limit was over without having its events stored remotely, then the 
case will miss the evidence that the server could be holding. Having a centralised copy 
of events means that the logs can be archived and retrieved whenever needed. The data 
being retrieved must be of a reliable source with high integrity and having a systems that 
does event collection automatically is better than what any number of human beings can 
do. 
Once meaningful information is processed in real-time one can create filters that will 
define which events should trigger alerts e.g. when a new user is created in the Active 
Directory. Reports are also integral to event collection as they can give high level to 
detailed information on the security status of the organisation, they are also useful for 
stakeholders such as management, auditors, security and compliance officers (Ipswitch, 
2010). The most common events to be monitored and alerted on in Windows systems are: 
changes to access control lists (ACLs), registry access and modification like additions and 
deletions, user account changes such as users getting administrative permissions, active 
directory access and changes, changes to groups – adds, deletions and changes, multiple 
windows login failures, successful logins, locked accounts, password change, password 
reset, application start, failure or shutdown, server reboots, dns changes, system events 
such as process start and stop, web server access and permission changes, ftp server 





2.10 Compliance and Standards on Event Collection 
2.10.1 Sarbanes – Oxley 
In the USA a mandatory act was passed to ensure corporate governance and regulation 
of financial practice. The bill was created by Senator Paul Sarbanes and Representative 
Michael Oxley in 2002. It is a regulations that must be complied to by all organisations in 
the USA. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) is used to protect investors from 
fraudulent accounting activities, it was created as a response to the Enron Corporation 
and WorldCom organisations were found to be carrying out fraudulent bookkeeping 
(Investopedia.com, 2003). 
The requirement that for Management Assessment of Internal Controls has been set by 
the SOX guidelines in Section 404. This section requires that all annual financial reports 
must include an Internal Control Report stating that management is responsible for an 
"adequate" internal control structure with an assessment of the effectiveness of the control 
structure being included within the report. External auditors should validate the 
accuracy of the reported internal controls (“Sarbanes-Oxley act summary of major 
sections,” n.d.). According to the Ipswitch white paper on Best practices on event log 
management (2010), when it comes to Information Systems the following are what 
standard requirements for the SOX regulations are: Identification: Logging and reporting 
on all user identities and access including privilege users to ensure that all users can be 
uniquely and irrefutably identified (Ipswitch, 2010). Authentication: All transactions 
from systems that can authenticate users should be logged and reported (Ipswitch, 2010). 
Policy-based access control: log and report that only authorised business users have 
access to systems, data and network assets (Ipswitch, 2010). Data Protection & Integrity: 
log and report on access to data, who accessed data, how long and if data was changed, 
modified or copied, data integrity fed from upstream sources into the application system 
(Ipswitch, 2010). Identity provisioning: Log and report of access for all users including 







Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) ensures that 
confidentiality, integrity and privacy of healthcare information stored and transmitted in 
electronic form from a information security standpoint (HHS, 2015). HIPAA provides 
strategies to protect against threats to the security and integrity of patient information 
but also requires that organisations have records sufficient enough for an audit trail in 
case of a breach. The audit trail must be sufficient enough to establish what events 
happened, when they happened and who/what caused them (Ipswitch, 2010). For 
HIPAA the requirements for event and logging are from Security rule 164.306 and 
Privacy rule 164.530. On Windows Systems the possible audit and security events 
required for logging are: password aging, consolidated change logs, user privileges, ntfs 
permissions, system privileges, role permissions and membership, remote access, user 
access, auditing enabled. 
 
2.11 Windows Event Analysis 
2.11.1 Windows Logging 
In the Windows environment logs are generated in relation to the operating system, 
applications and security. Application log which are events logged by applications such 
as IIS, MSSQL, DNS, Domain Controller and other Microsoft applications (Magalhaes, 
2003). Security log which contain show logon attempts which could be successful or failed 
authentications as well as events related to resources use, such as creating, opening, or 
deleting files or other objects. System log contains system component event such as driver 
failures and hardware issues (Magalhaes, 2003). In Windows Operating Systems the 
Security Logging option is by default not turned on, and it requires the administrator to 




Windows log messages are known as Events and are stored in the 
“C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs” directory in binary format (Forensics Wiki, 
2016). Windows XP, 2000, 2003 store logs with .evt extension whereas newer Windows 
versions use the .evtx extension(Forensics Wiki, 2016). All Windows event logs can be 
viewed using the Windows native Event Viewer.  
 
2.12 Analysis Using Windows Event Viewer 
The Event Viewer is a Windows native graphical application used to view Windows 
binary logs (with extensions .evt or .evtx), which is available on most of the Windows 
versions. Events are displayed based on the LogName, which is just a reference to the 
logs generated by a specific application such as Application, Security, System, Setup and 
etc (Stanek, 2000).  
Analysis of windows events can be done in several ways, the first one and most common 
is using the Windows Event Viewer. This is an application that will access the Windows 
Event Log files which are stored in the directory C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs 
and display the events in a formatted view (Microsoft, 2011).  According to Hoffman 
(2012) the Event Viewer can help administrators find errors to help troubleshoot 
problems in applications. The Event Viewer will display events in specific categories such 
as Application log for application events or System log for Windows system events 
(Hoffman, 2012). The event viewer will show events of the following type for each 
category of logs captured. 
 
Table 2.1 Event Types in Windows (Microsoft, 2011) 
Type Description 
Error Events that indicates a problem such as data or function loss. 




Warning This events are used to indicate a future problem that could 
arise e.g. disk running low (Stanek, 2000). 
Information This denotes events that are from successful service activities 
such as a service running after a restart (Stanek, 2000). 
Success 
Audit 
This shows events which are successful security access 
attempts e.g. a successful attempt to login (Stanek, 2000). 
Failure 
Audit 
This is for a security access attempt that fails e.g. a user with 
wrong credentials attempting a login (Stanek, 2000). 
  
According to William Stanek (2000) events on the event viewer, it will also contain 
information about the Source as the application, service, or component that generated the 
event. The category of the event to further describe the related action. An EventID as 
identifier for the specific event. The user account name that was running the service or 
application. The name of the computer where the event occurred. A text description of 
the event and any data or error code output by the source about the event. 
The Event Viewer also allows for other Windows based systems to forward their events 
to a central Windows server dedicated for event storage which can be useful to monitor 
several Windows Systems from a central Event Viewer (Costea, 2016). The challenge here 
is that only Windows Servers can send logs to the Event Viewer limiting if the 
organization is to expand event collection to UNIX or network devices. The Event Viewer 
will provide the IP address of important security events that can be useful during 
investigations. The challenge is that IP addresses cannot be filtered using the mechanism 
provided by the Event Viewer (Mullinix, 2013). According to Microsoft Support (2015) 
the Event Viewer with newer version of Windows can handle a maximum of 16GB for 





Figure 2.4 Windows Event Viewer (Hoffman, 2012) 
To analyse events from the Event Viewer one has to create filters for specific events which 
is best done by knowing the EventIDs for each security events. The most common 





Table 2.2 Windows Security Event (Hoffman, 2012) 
Event Name Event ID 
Account Lockouts 4740 
User Added to Privileged Group 4728, 4732, 4756 
Security-Enabled group Modification  4735 
Successful User Account Login  4624 
Failed User Account Login  4625 
Account Login with Explicit Credentials  4648 
 
 
2.13 Analysis Using Regular Expressions (Regex) 
Regular expression is the use of strings with character literals and operators that can be 
used to identify specific patterns from text data (Rouse,2016). According to Russ Anthony 
(2013), event filtering from the windows Event Viewer can use regular expressions to 
capture various events as seen in Table 2.2. Jamie Zawinski the creator of Netscape once 
said “Some people, when confronted with a problem, think ‘I know, I’ll use regular 
expressions.’ Now they have two problems” in reference to the difficulty of using regular 
expression (Zawinski, 2011). The challenge with using regular expressions is creating 
strings to effectively parse a different types of events without missing key elements in 
each. This can be resolved by having a developer modify or add regex filters until all 
necessary events are captured by the analyser properly.  
 
Table 2.3 Regular Expressions for Windows Events (Anthony, 2013) 





".*APPCRASH.*"  Application 1001 
".*he protected system file.*" Application 64004 
".*EMET_DLL Module logged the following event:.*" Application 2 
".*A new process has been created\..*"  Security  4688 
".*A service was installed in the system\..*" Security 4697 
".*A scheduled task was created\..*" Security 4698  





".*service terminated unexpectedly\..*" System 7034  
".*service was successfully sent a.*"  System 7035  
".*service entered the.*" System 7036  
".*service was changed from.*" System 7040  
 
2.14 Microsoft Azure Log Analytics 
 
Microsoft Azure is a public cloud computing platform developed by Microsoft to host 
various products and services over the cloud such as computing, storage, network and 
analytics (Rouse, 2016). To collect events from Windows Systems the Azure offers a Log 
Analytics service will collect events through the Microsoft Monitoring Agent (MMA), 




Azure (Anderson and Rundle, 2017). Microsoft Azure Log analytics is a closed source 
service where users are limited to only the options that are supported by Microsoft Azure, 
this means that having custom events or application events that may be found in other 
sources is a challenge while it also has a limited visualizing element (Cavanagh, 2016).  
 
 
Figure 2.5 Azure Log Analysis Service (Anderson and Rundle, 2017) 
 
The Log Analysis service in Azure will process the events sent by the Microsoft 
Monitoring Agents into the following parts (Anderson and Rundle, 2017): 
 
Table 2.4 Event Analysis with Azure Log Analysis Service (Anderson and Rundle, 
2017) 
Property Description 





EventCategory Category of the event. 
EventData All event data in raw format. 
EventID Number of the event. 
EventLevel Severity of the event in numeric form. 
EventLevelName Severity of the event in text form. 
EventLog Name of the event log that the event was collected 
from. 
ParameterXml Event parameter values in XML format. 
ManagementGroupName Name of the management group for System Center 
Operations Manager agents. For other agents, this 
value is AOI- 
RenderedDescription Event description with parameter values 
Source Source of the event. 
SourceSystem Type of agent the event was collected from.  
TimeGenerated Date and time the event was created in Windows. 






2.15 Analysis of Windows Events using OSSEC  
Ossec is a Host Based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) that relies of rules to analyse 
security events that its agents collect (Bray, Hay, & Cid, 2008). According to Daniel Cid 
(2007) in Log Analysis using Ossec, “Log Analysis for intrusion detection is the process 
or techniques used to detect attacks on a specific environment using logs as the primary 
source of information”. When it comes to Windows Security events analysis with ossec, 
an agent will be installed in the Windows Operating System as it is the primary source of 
information. The Ossec agent will collect all relevant logs and send them to the Ossec 
server for analysis. Analysis at the Ossec server is done by decoders based on Regular 




Figure 2.6 Ossec Event Analysis (Cid, 2007) 
 
2.15.1 OSSEC Event Analysis Process 
The log analysis at the Ossec server works in three main parts (Cid, 2007): 




 Decoding – Extracting unexpected fields such as usernames, ip addresses. 
 Signatures – Using defined rules to prioritize and alert on events.  
 
Figure 2.7 Ossec Internal log flow (Cid,2007) 
 
A pre-decoder for windows date: 
<decoder name="windows-date-format"> 
<prematch>^\d\d\d\d-\d\d-\d\d \d\d:\d\d:\d\d </prematch> 
</decoder> 




<regex offset="after_parent">^\.+: (\w+)\((\d+)\): (\.+): </regex> 
<regex>(\.+): \.+: (\S+): </regex> 
<order>status, id, extra_data, user, system_name</order> 
<fts>name, location, system_name</fts> 
</decoder> 
An example of a signature for windows events: 






<description>User account enabled or created.</description> 
<group>adduser,account_changed,</group> 
</rule> 
The challenge with OSSEC is that it currently lack a method for visualizing events 
captured and analysed as the OSSEC Web User Interface was stopped as of 2013 and is 
no longer maintained by its creators (Parriot, 2013). 
 
2.16 Log Analysis Tools 
Log analysis consists of: parsing fields in collected log records, the ability to view the 
records in a consolidated form, perform search operations for specific data using custom 
queries and highlighting results that might be of interest. While the log file viewers with 
searching capabilities might offer sufficient functionality for basic application 
monitoring, they may not be good enough when it comes to the collection logs from 
multiple sources with high volumes. The event analysis and searching in high numbers 
of log files records for specific issues will often require more resources and applications 
built to handle large amounts of events, with the ability to store them for archival 
purpose. Searching and filtering is often based on regular expression input and 
configurable queries filtering contents, which is also a limitation to evnt log file viewers 
such as Microsoft Event Viewer. Below are application log files view and analysis tools:  
Log Expert – This is a free open source tool for Windows, contains search, filtering, 
highlighting and timestamp features (Raab, 2011). 
Chainsaw – This is an open souce desktop application for Apache logging services 
focuses on GUI-based Log4J files view, monitoring and processing. It offers searching, 
filtering and highlighting features (Apache, 2007). 
Retrospective – Commercial solution for managing log files data working on multiple 




friendly UI design. Pricing for personal use starts at $92 (centeractive, 2015). 
2.17 Centralized event logging and monitoring systems 
The key factors to consider when choosing an event logging and monitoring system are 
as follows: 
Visualizations – This means being able to create graphs and charts of information that is 
collected (Warda, 2017). 
Accessible everywhere. – This is remote accessibility of the systems, this is best achieved 
by having a web accessible system (Warda, 2017). 
Remote location. – Having the system run in it’s own dedicated resources rather than it 
residing on the same location as the source of the monitored events (Warda, 2017). 
Centralized logging. – Having a core location where all event logs from multiple 
machines are sent automatically and stored without having to collect them on demand 
(Warda, 2017). 
Custom events. – The system should be flexible enough to allow custom events from 
unknown sources to be stored and analysed (Warda, 2017). 
Real-time. – Having events being collected and analysed in the system as they happen on 
the machines generating the events (Warda, 2017). 
Alerting – The ability to include alerting mechanisms for rules and thresholds that one 
may want (Warda, 2017). 
Historic data. – Having the ability to keep collected events for a specified retention period 
as demanded by the user (Warda, 2017). 
 
 
2.18 Conclusion  
Computer systems, networks and software applications events are recorded in their log 
files. Log files serve as an important source of information for purposes of analysis of 




is beneficial in identifying problems and security threats in the system through analysis 
of log files for pattern identification indicating suspicious system behaviour.  In the past, 
log file analysis was carried out manually which would lead to missing some event logs 
containing important information. Log files are large in size and this would prolong the 
process of log analysis. Having a platform to carry out log analysis will enable security 
events to be identified with more ease. This will eliminate the time taken for compromise 
to be identified and swift action by the incident management can be followed through 
before damage is realized by the organization. Customizable visualizing of these events 
will allow analysts to identify patterns and anomalies more effectively as compared to 




CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the software methodology to be used in the development process 
of the system. The software methodology was made up of the following key sections: 
Requirements analysis, system design, coding, testing and evaluation methods then 
implementation. 
3.2 Software Methodology 
The software methodology used for the developemt was Secure System Development 
Life Cycle (SSDLC). It is a multistep method that starts with system analysis, system 
design, implementation and testing; it then stays through the maintenance and usage of 
the system. SSDLC is the most effective methodology to secure information and 
information systems because it integrates security into every step of the system 
development process, from the beginning of a project to develop a system to its 
disposition (Crosby, 2016).  
 
Figure 3.1 Secure SDLC (Crosby, 2016) 




3.3 Requirements Gathering 
This is a phase where user requirements were identified and analysed. The analysis 
results were used in answering the research questions and also used while designing and 
developing the proposed system.  
3.3.1 Feasibility Study 
This was conducted through literature review on existing and other proposed methods 
used for windows event analysis. 
3.3.2 Research Design 
The kind of research design to be used greatly relies on the specific research objectives 
and has to relate with the research questions (Kothari, 2004). The quasi-experimental 
research design was used for this case study. Quasi-experimental research designs test 
the relations in given environments with the aim of analysing outcomes of interest based 
on treatments. This research design was chosen as the research analyses if the proposed 
event analysis approach is able to identify security concerns on Windows Operating 
Systems and accurately analyse them in a timely manner. 
 
3.4 System Design 
System design involves the sectioning of the system to be developed into components for 
purposes of studying how these components work together to achieve system 
functionality (Gemino & Parker, 2009).  The use case diagram models the system 
functionalities and gives an illustration of how system actors interact with the system 
processes known as use cases (Mishra & Mohanty, 2012).  
 
3.5 System Implementation 
The development of the system involved the construction of a web vizualization 
application and an event analysis system that is connected to a non relational database. 




virtualised environment. Below are the approaches that were used in the development of 
the Analysis and Event processing System 
i) Data Visualisation System 
The web application was developed using Kibana, which is a visualisation application 
for the Elastic Stack, it provides a user interface for Elasticsearch giving visualisation in 
terms of graphs, charts and other visual mappings of data (Anderson & Kuć, 2016). 
ii) Database and Indexing System. 
The database was developed using ElasticSearch database, which is a non relational 
database (Banon, 2010). Reasons for using ElasticSearch are: it is an open platform, it is 
fully compatible with PHP and other platforms and it is a non-relational database that 
does indexing of all data entered this is for the best performance or a searching platform 
(Cholakian, 2014). Elasticsearch is implemented in RESTful HTTP/JSON using a java 
library called Lucene, which allows for a schema-free database server which uses 
different terms from relational databases (Khan, 2013). The comparison between 
elasticsearch componenets and relational databases is as seen in Table 3.1 below. 
Table 3.1 Comparison between Relational Databases and Elasticsearch (Khan, 2013) 







iii) Event Analysis System 
The event analysis engine was developed using Logstash which is a data processing 
engine that enriches data from any kind and gives it a proper context (Anderson & Kuć, 




using a json parser. Logstash is good at extracting useful information from bulk data that 
comes into the system and normalising the data to useful fields that are then sent to 
Elasticsearch for storage and indexing (Anderson & Kuć, 2016).  
iv) Data Collection Systems 
A windows event collection agent was used to collect events from windows systems. 
These are agents used to query and collect data from Windows Operating systems 
sources and send the captured events to a system for processing. The agent used was 
Nxlogs community edition, which is a small and easy to deploy for whatever location 
they are needed in. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Elasticsearch, Logstash and Kibana Setup (WiredPulse, 2015) 
3.6 System Testing   
The system was tested against its specifications to verify whether it complied with the 
functional requirements. The following tests were done: 
Unit Testing: This was to test if the individual componenets of the system were able to 
function as required. This was done by checking the service status of each service in the 
system and monitoring for unexpected outputs. 
Compatibility Testing: Since the system is accessed from only the web browser, the test 




browsers, Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox and Internet Explorer. 
Functionality Testing: This was done by creating events on the Windows 10 system that 
would be analysed by the system. The sampling data for testing was identified from 
literature review as the security and audit events to be monitored. The test data was 
generated from the Windows 10 system as follows. A user logon event, a failed 
authentication event by having wrong credentials as inputs to a login, creating a new 
user, resetting the password of the created user, modification of rights of the created user 







CHAPTER 4: SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the architecture and design of the windows srcurity and event 
analysis system that satisfies the requirements discovered during the prototyping phase. 
 
4.2 System Architecture 
The system architecture of the proposed system can be represented in three tiers.  
These are the presentation layer, the data processing layer, and the event storage layer.  
The presentation tier presents data to the user is web based an to be accessed from a 
browser. It presents a view processed data and allow users to visualize the processed 
data into graphs and charts. The data processing layer is used to process events collected 
by the windows agents from raw unformatted data to indexed information. The event 
storage layer consists of a denormalized database to store the data indexed by data 
processing layer. 
The architecture include agents (nxlogs) which are installed in the Windows servers, that 
are used to capture security events and send to the event processor. The event processor 
(Logstash) converts the received events into indexed data that can be stored in the 
database (Elasticsearch). When a user wants to view the events they will connect to the 





Figure 4.1 Architecture Design 
 
4.3 Sequence Diagram 
Figure 4.2 shows a sequence diagram with the processes that occur from the agent up to 





Figure 4.2 Sequence Diagram 
 
 
4.4 Use Case Modelling 
The top level use case diagram of the system is shown in figure 4.2. The only actor is the 





Figure 4.3 Use Case Diagram for security analysis platform 
 
 
4.4.1 Use Case 1: Search Events 
This use case shows how the security analyst will search the system to view security 
events collected that could be of interest to the organization. 
 
Table 4.1 Search Events Use Case 
Use Case Name: Search Events 
Scenario Done via a web browser 




or specific search strings such as IP Address, username, 
eventid or any string that could be used to identify an event. 
Actors Security Analyst 
Preconditions The system must have received events that can fulfill the 
search criteria or the will be null results. The events must be 
processed and indexed appropriately to allow for effective 
searching of events. 
Post-conditions Results of the search should be displayed to the user through 
the web browser. 
Flow of Events 
(Steps) 
Actor System 
 The user gives an input for a 
search criteria. 
System displays events that 
qualify to fit under the search 
criteria. 
 
4.4.2 Use Case 2: Create filters 
This use case outlines how the user can create filters, the filters are useful for easy reuse 
of most common search criterias. 
 
Table 4.2 Create Filters Use Case 
Use Case Name: Create Filters 
Scenario Done via a web browser 
Brief Description The user will create a search criteria and save it as a filter. 
Actors Security Analyst 
Preconditions The user must create a valid search criteria 






 The user gives an input for a 
search criteria and stores it as 
a filter. 
System should store the filter 
for easy access for the user. 
 
4.4.3 Use Case 3: Create Reports 
This use case outlines how the user can create reports, which are in pdf version. 
 
Table 4.3 Create Reports Use Case 
Use Case Name: Create Reports 
Scenario Done via a web browser 
Brief Description The user will run a search and export the results as a report 
Actors Security Analyst 
Preconditions The user must create a valid search criteria 
Flow of Events 
(Steps) 
Actor System 
 The user gives an input for a 
search criteria and exports it 
as a filter. 
System should process the 
report for the user. 
 
4.4.4 Use Case 5: Create Visualisation 
This use case outlines how the user can create visualisations. 
 
Table 4.4 Create Visualisation Use Case 
Use Case Name: Create Visualization 
Scenario Done via a web browser 




required filters and search queries. 
Actors Security Analyst 
Preconditions The user must have valid search queries and filters. 
 
4.4.5 Use Case 6: Create Dashboards 
This use case outlines how the user can create dashboards. 
 
Table 4.5 Create Dasboards Use Case 
Use Case Name: Create Dashboards 
Scenario Done via a web browser 
Brief Description The user will add a collection of  related visualizations to an 
empty dashboard. 
Actors Security Analyst 
Preconditions The user must have created visualizations 
 
 
4.5 Context Diagram 
A context diagram is a component of functional modelling that stands out on its own as 






Figure 4.4 Context Diagram 
 
4.6 Database Indexing  
The indexing of data coming into elasticsearch is processed into the following categories 
by kibana per field: 
i Type: Where the field is identified either as a string, integer or any other type. 
ii Searchable: Some fields are indexed to be searchable through the kibana, meaning 
that they can be used in the filter bar. 
iii Aggregatable: These fields can be used to create aggregates, which is useful in the 
development of visualization. 
iv Analyzed: These are fields that have a value that carries more information and 
will require more resources e.g. memory to visualize. 












CHAPTER 5: SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION AND TESTING 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the implementation of the proposed system and highlights the  key  
features.  The  features  and  functionality  incorporated  are  the  result  of incorporating 
user views and requirements obtained from the evolutionary prototyping phase. This 
section also includes screenshots of the various end user and back end screens.  
This section of this chapter describes the various tests that were carried out on the system. 
It includes a discussion on the testing processes, locations, and a population that was 
taken into consideration.  
 
5.2 System Specification 
The system holding the applications will have the following specifications all under a 
virtualized environment: 
1. Analysis and event processing system: 
i. Ubuntu server 16.04 
ii. 4 GB RAM 
iii. 20 GB Disk 
iv. Logstash version 5.3.0 
v. Elasticsearch version 5.3.0 
vi. Kibana version 5.3.0 
2. Windows 10 Operating System to be tested: 
i. 2 GB RAM 
ii. 20 GB Disk  





5.3 System Implementation and Testing 
5.3.1 Event Collection Configuration on Windows  
The Windows 10 virtual machine was configured to capture audit events by first enabling 
security events to be audited in the Local Security Policy tool in the Windows machine. 
This was done to allow the Windows system to generate events when specific actions 
were taken by a user. The actions were such account logon, account management, policy 
changes and system events as seen in Figure 5.1.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Local Security Policy 
Installation and configuration of Nxlog agent in the Windows system to capture the 
audited events. Nxlogs was configured to collect only security events from windows, 




TCP port 5000, see Appendix A. The JSON output sample of what nxlog sends to 
Logstash can be seen in figure 5.2. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Nxlog Text Output Sample 
 
5.3.2 Event Analysis Configuration 
The individual componenets of the event analysis were installed in Ubuntu 16.04 
operating system, see Appendix C. Since each componenet is an independent component 
the configurations were made to allow for communication between them to be possible 
through specific ports: 
Elasticsearch was configured to be accessed through port 9200. 
Kibana was configured to be accessed through port 5601. 
Logstash was configured to receive events from nxlog agent using port 5000. 
5.3.2.1 Logstash Configuration 
The configuration for the Logstash service was made by having the input data source 
being any event that is captured from port 5000, which is where nxlog is sending data to. 




the source. As source code sample below shows. 
input { 
  tcp { 
    codec => json_lines { charset => "UTF-8" } 
    port => 5000 
    tags => [ "tcpjson" ] 
    type => "nxlog" 
  } 
} 
The filter for the configuration is a json parser that will capture all data that is of type 
nxlog and check for those that have the SourceModuleName as eventlog and a mutation 
function of logstash will replace and remove the Message field. Then capture the 
EventTime field to be used as the time stamp for the field. 
 
filter { 
  if [type] == "nxlog" { 
    json { 
      source => "message" 
    } 
    if [SourceModuleName] == "eventlog" { 
      mutate { 
        replace => [ "message", "%{Message}" ] 
      } 
      mutate { 
        remove_field => [ "Message" ] 
      } 




    date { 
      locale => "en" 
      match => [ "EventTime", "YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss" ] 
    } 
  } 
} 
 
After the filter has been used to capture the events coming in from the input, processed 
data can be directed to the output configuration. The output location for this system is 
the elasticsearch service, which is receiving events from logstash on port 9200. 
 
output { 
  elasticsearch { 
    hosts => [ "localhost:9200" ] 
  } 
} 
See Appendix B for full configuration. 
To start the Logstash service one has to run the command service logstash start if there 
are no errors given back the service will start. 
5.4 System Features 
After the installation and configuration of all components both on Windows 10 and 
Ubuntu Server virtual machines the following were the features available on the security 
monitoring. platform 
5.4.1 Event Searching 
When the user accesses the system from the browser they should be able to get the Kibana 
web user interface where they can search for specific events using strings. Figure 5.3 




created then deleted by the system administrator. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Event Searching 
5.4.2 Event Parsing 
Event parsing is done by the Logstash service (in the backend) by analysing the raw 
events in JSON format and then normalizing and indexing them into specific fields. 
Figure 5.4 shows the raw log for an event relating to the deletion of user “test”. 
 
Figure 5.4 Event Parsing Raw Log 
When normalized and indexed the raw log in Figure 5.4 can be expanded into a more 
detailed output with specified fields giving information on each part of the event log as 









5.4.3 Creating a Saved Search 
A saved search is a search query that is saved on the Kibana for reuse in the future. This 
is mainly for common search parameters that the user may occasionally use. The saved 
searches are commonly used as a pre-requisite when one wants to create some 
visualisation. Figure 5.6 shows a list of saved searches that the user may reuse for 
Windows Security event analysis. 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Saved Search 
After running a successful search for events on Kibana, there is an option that allows one 





Figure 5.7 Saving a Search 
 
5.4.4 Creating a Visualisation 
Visualisations will aid the security analyst in getting high level over view of events 
collected by the system. These are created from the saved searches and will used the 
indexed fields in normalised events as options when it comes to creating charts and 
graphs. Figure 5.8 shows an example of a visualisation of the top five windows Event IDs  






Figure 5.8 Visualisation 
 
5.4.5 Creating Reports 
With saved searches and visualisations being available and having relevant data in them 
one can generate reports form them. The reporting option in Kibana converts the results 
given in HTML via the web browser into PDF files which the user can download and 
share. Kibana provides a Reporting manager tool that will handle the conversion of 






Figure 5.9 Saved Search Used For Reporting 
 
 






Figure 5.11 Report Output 
 
5.4.6 Creating Dashboards 
Dashboards are a collection of several Visualisations as set by the system user depending 
on points of interest. 
 
 





5.5 System Testing 
This Section covers testing of the system to ensure that it works well. The testing was 
divided into two sections, developer testing and user Assessment testing. The first tests 
done by the developer were to ensure that the various functionalities were working well, 
the tests included: unit testing, compatibility testing, functionality testing. 
5.5.1 Functionality testing 
Testing was done by creating events on the Windows 10 system that were captured by 
the analysis platform. The events were: 
i. User Login with user ghost. 
ii. Failed authentication event with user ghost to simulate a bruteforce attacke by 
checking the count of failed authentication attacks agains one user account. 
iii. Creation of user test by user ghost 
iv. Password reset for user test by user ghost. 
v. User Account modification of user test. 
vi. Deletion of user test by user ghost. 
The results for the tests can be seen in Figure 5.13 where a dashboard was created to 
capture these events after analysis and grouped to different event tables. 
 
 
Figure 5.13 Test Results on Dashboard 




were no failures on them. 
 
5.5.2 Unit and Intergration Testing 
In unit testing, the individual units were scrutinized to test for operation. The isolated 
software components were separately tested to ensure that each component performs 
required function. Integration testing was performed after system integration where two 
or more of the components were integrated and tested for their functionality. During this 
test, some errors were deduced and corrected. The test were done by checking if the 
individual componenets of the system were running by checking if their service ports 
were open. 
5.5.2.1 Logstash 
The Logstash service was set to receive events using TCP port 5000. The test was to check 
if the port was open and if it was receiving any data from the agent. This was done by 
running tcpdump command to check if the port was receiving any data. 
 
 
Figure 5.14 Logstash Tcpdump Output 




Figure 5.15 Logstash Connections 




can see the IP 192.168.56.1 is connected to the system’s IP 192.168.56.101 on the port 5000. 
 
 
5.5.2.2 Elasticsearch  
The Elasticsearch service was set to receive data from Logstash on port 9200 and also 
receive requests from Kibana on the port 9200. The figure 5.16 below shows the 




Figure 5.16 Elasticsearch Connections 
5.5.2.3 Kibana  
Kibana is a service that runs on the port 5601, and it was running by listening for 






Figure 5.17 Kibana Service 
5.5.3 Compatibility Testing 
Compatibility testing was done to ensure that the web application is compatible with the 
available platforms. As table 5.1 below shows. 
 
Table 5.1 Browser Compatibility Tests 
Browser Compatibility 
Firefox (version 8.0 and above) Yes 
Internet Explorer (versions 4 and above) Yes 







CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the dissertation was to review the existing solutions used in threat 
monitoring and event collection, to investigate the current techniques used for event 
analysis, to design and develop and test a platform that can collect, analyse and visualise 
Windows security events and to validate the effectiveness of the proposed solution. This 
was done in order to identify and develop a suitable technique that will be used by 
security analysts to monitor the security of windows systems in an organization. The 
research findings helped in identifying the appropriate technique which was adopted 
and a platform for collecting and analysing windows security and audit events then 
visualising them for the users ease. 
 
6.2 Findings and Achievements 
A review of the literature indicated the techniques most organizations cannot detect 
security breaches in their systems due to lack of effective monitoring. Security intrusions 
that occur can run up to 80 days without the security team knowing about it while 
containment of the security breach is done after 2 days. This shows that if the process of 
detecting security breaches can be improved, then an organization can contain the any 
security breach a few days there after. The cost of impelementing a proprietary security 
monitoring tool is a challenge to most organizations.  
The developed system is an effective way to ensure that security breaches that occour on 
windows systems are identified as early as possible. The developed system is based on 
open-source tools that are widely documented and supported meaning that the cost is 
not a major factor when choosing this system. This project will therefor improve the 





6.3 Review of Research Objectives 
This dissertation identifies the challenges faced by organizations in the identifying 
security breaches in windows systems based on journals, websites and books. A security 
monitoring system was designed and develop with a selected technique from the 
literature review and results from system analysis. The research objectives acted as a 
guideline to develop the system. 
The first objective was to identify the purpose of security monitoring and event collection, 
this was achieved using litereature review. Most organizations fail to detect intrusions 
due to lack of proper monitoring of security events generated by the IT infrastructure. 
The collection, analysis and monitoring of security events was also noted to be part of 
best practice that is manadatory for organizations that seek to attain certain compliance 
certifications such as HIPAA and SOX. This shows that security events monitoring is key 
to ensuring that an organization is up to par with best practices while ensuring that they 
are able to secure the organization with early detection of incidents. 
The second objective was to review the existing solutions used in threat monitoring and 
event collection. This was achieved through reviewing secondary data and reading 
journals article. The review of the secondary data revealed that the existing solutions 
require the organizations to have competent security personel to use them in order to 
monitor security. The analysis systems used relied on tools such as regular expressions 
and there were limited options when it came to visualising of security events. The cost of 
running security management systems is also too high for organizations and many end 
up relying on vendors for deployment and the cost hiring and training of analysts is also 
factored in.  
The third objective was to design and develop and test a platform that can collect, analyse 
and visualise Windows security events. This objective was achieved through the design, 
implementation and testing of the system. It was developed using the combination of 




carried out; functional testing where the system functionality was tested against several 
security events that were generated from the Windows system, compatibility testing was 
tested against different web browsers and unit testing was done to check if seperate 
componenets were working effectively. 
The fourth objective was to validate the effectiveness of the proposed solution, this was 
done by running tests with use cases of what an attacker would do with access to a 
Windows system. The tests proved that it was possible for an analyst to serach for 
security events create saved searches for reuse, create visualisations that were used in 
creating dashboards to display analysed security events. The solution provided can be 
used during forensic investigations if implemented at a whole scale by showing evidence 
of user activity in relation to security and auditable events in the workstations and servers 




CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
7.1 Conclusions 
This dissertation developed a platform for the monitoring of security and audit events 
for windows systems that can be used by organizations in monitoring security incidents. 
This comes as an aid for organizations to ensure that they are able to protect their 
organization’s information security assets from malicious actors. The solution was based 
of tools that are open source and widely contributed to by the community, the only 
expense and limitation during deployment of the platform is that of hardware resources 
that an organization may have.  
7.2 Recommendations 
This dissertation only focused on the Windows operating system as a source of security 
and audit events but the system is not limited to that. The platform can be configured to 
collect and analyse security events from Unix based systems that have syslog, networking 
devices and custom applications that an organization may have. However when 
deploying one will have to configure analysis rules to allow other sorces of security 
events. 
7.3 Future Works 
An expansion into event collection from other sources and intergration with Threat 
Intelligence feeds will highly improve the knowledge base for security event analysis and 
monitoring. Artificial Intelligence can also be used by learning an organizations normal 
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Appendix A: Nxlog Configuration 
 
## This is a sample configuration file. See the nxlog reference manual about the 
## configuration options. It should be installed locally and is also available 
## Please set the ROOT to the folder your nxlog was installed into, 
## otherwise it will not start. 

















    Module      im_msvistalog 
    Query       <QueryList>\ 
                   <Query Id="0">\ 
                        <Select Path="Security">*</Select>\ 
                    </Query>\ 
                </QueryList> 
</Input> 
<Output out> 




    Host        192.168.56.101 
    Port        5000 
    Exec        to_json(); 
</Output> 
<Route 1> 
    Path        in => out 
</Route> 
Appendix B: Logstash Configuration 
 
input { 
  tcp { 
    codec => json_lines { charset => "UTF-8" } 
    # codec => json_lines { charset => CP1252 } 
    port => 5000 
    tags => [ "tcpjson" ] 
    type => "nxlog" 
  } 
} 
filter { 
  if [type] == "nxlog" { 
    json { 
      source => "message" 
    } 
    if [SourceModuleName] == "eventlog" { 
      mutate { 
        replace => [ "message", "%{Message}" ] 
      } 
      mutate { 
        remove_field => [ "Message" ] 
      } 
    } 
    date { 
      locale => "en" 
      # timezone => "Etc/GMT" 
      # timezone => "Asia/Shanghai" 
      match => [ "EventTime", "YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss" ] 









  elasticsearch { 
    hosts => [ "localhost:9200" ] 





Appendix C: Installation of Elasticsearch, Logstash and Kibana 
 
Pre-requesites  
Ubuntu 16.04 64 bit server with 4GB of RAM 
 
Install Java. 
Elasticsearch and Logstash require java to run. 
Add java repository to the apt sources.list file. 
sudo add-apt-repository -y ppa:webupd8team/java 
Update the apt service to capture new source for java. 
sudo apt-get update 
Install Java from repositories. 
sudo apt-get -y install oracle-java8-installer 
 
Install Elasticsearch. 
sudo apt install -y elasticsearch 
Edit Elasticsearch configuration.  
sudo nano /etc/elasticsearch/elasticsearch.yml 
Uncomment the network.host line, then save and exit the file. 
network.host: localhost 




sudo systemctl restart elasticsearch 
Set the Elastic search service to run at boot. 
sudo systemctl daemon-reload 
sudo systemctl enable elasticsearch 
 
Install Kibana 
sudo apt-get -y install kibana 
Edit the Kibana configuration file 
sudo nano /opt/kibana/config/kibana.yml 
Edit the server.hot value from 0.0.0.0 to localhost 
server.host: "localhost" 
 
Enable Kibana to start at boot after reboot. 
sudo systemctl daemon-reload 
sudo systemctl enable kibana 
sudo systemctl start kibana 
 
Install Logstash. 
sudo apt-get –y install logstash 
Enable Logstash to start after a reboot. 
sudo systemctl restart logstash 
sudo systemctl enable logstash 
Create a file for Logstash to receive and process windows events from nxlogs by putting 
the configuration found in Appendix B. 
sudo nano /etc/logstash/conf.d/windows.conf 
 
